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Abstract
This paper tries to explain what comparative constitutional law is and takes the 
US legal practice as an example. The presence of comparative analysis is considered 
both in the academic arena and in the case law of the US Supreme Court. The 
conclusion of this part of the article is that for comparative constitutional law 
to be valid its role ought to be restricted by several constraints. The article also 
suggests that the comparative enterprise only makes sense if the universality of 
human rights is first acknowledged. The paper next delves into such universality 
and connects it with notions of new classical natural law that are considered 
essential in order to adequately understand the problem. Finally, it provides an 
example of the misuse of comparative constitutionalism.
Introduction
As I awoke in my hotel room in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on 15 January 
2005, my eyes caught an unusual picture on the front page of  the New York 
Times: United States of  America (US) Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia 
and Stephen Breyer were portrayed sitting on armchairs in a living room, in what 
seemed to be – and was – a debate at American University in Washington DC.1 
1 On the origins of  the Scalia-Breyer debate, see Dorsen N, ‘The relevance of  foreign materials in 
US constitutional cases: A conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’ 
3 International Journal on Constitutional Law 4 (2005) 519, 519-520, which includes a lightly edited 
* Professor of Law, Universidad Católica Argentina; Visiting Professor, University of Notre 
Dame Law School and Strathmore Law School (Nairobi); researcher, CONICET (Buenos 
Aires). LLB., Universidad Católica Argentina; MSt, Oxford; PhD., Universidad de Buenos 
Aires. I thank Zachary Calo, Rick Garnett, Claire Leatherwood, Richard Ekins, Seba Elias, 
Randy Kozel, Malenita Munoz Legarre, Florencia Ratti Mendaña, and Paul Yowell for their 
gracious comments. I have also benefited from helpful remarks by those present at the Notre 
Dame Law School Faculty Workshop of 27 March 2014.
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Given that the reason for my presence in the United States at that time was to 
teach a class titled “Comparative constitutional law” my eyes became even more 
dilated when I realised that the debate had been on the use of  foreign law in 
constitutional adjudication.
Furthermore, I learned subsequently, that debate had been broadcast live on 
television by C-Span, the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network, a mainstream 
US cable television network. The Supreme Court justices had competed with the 
Simpsons. Though the fight was probably not a fair one the mere fact that you 
can even watch Supreme Justices discussing academic matters on TV is telling. 
These, however, were not just any academic matters. The fact that this happened 
instructs us about the pressing public relevance of  the debate around compara-
tive constitutional law. Or, if  you want to put it critically, and to borrow from 
another Supreme Court justice, it instructs us about “moods, fads, or fashions.”2
In any case, and possible fashions apart, it is clear that the Scalia-Breyer 
debate is only an outstanding manifestation of  a broader reality: the explosion in 
the last few decades of  comparative constitutional law both as an academic dis-
cipline and as a judicial practice, especially of  supreme courts and constitutional 
tribunals; and especially regarding fundamental human rights.3 This is true, at 
least, in the Western world; though recent teaching trips to East Africa and to In-
dia have alerted me to the reality that the span of  the comparative constitutional 
wave is perhaps not thus confined.4
When it comes to what could be termed judicial comparative constitutional 
law, typically a national supreme court of  country A will invoke a decision of  the 
national supreme court of  country B in order to justify a decision in country A 
or in order to reinvigorate a certain reasoning or the reasonableness of  a certain 
transcription of  the discussion, approved by the two Justices. References to the debate in this ar-
ticle, however, are from the literal transcript, that can be found in http://domino.american.edu/
AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F 
890068E6E0?OpenDocument, on 10 January 2014. It ought not to be confused with a different 
one, between the same Justices and also held in Washington DC, but on different topics. The latter 
one, co-organised by the American Constitution Society and the Federalist Society can be consulted 
here: http://www.fed- soc.org/publications/pubID.173/pub_detail.asp#, on 8 January 2014.
2 Foster v Florida, 537 US 990, n (2002) (Thomas J concurring in denial of  certiorari).
3 Groppi T and Ponthoreau M, The use of  foreign precedents by constitutional judges, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2013, 416 (explaining how their research shows that citations of  foreign case law prevail “in human 
rights decisions, whereas they appear less frequently in institutional decisions”.)
4 I presented an earlier version of  this paper in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Bhubaneswar, Orissa, in the 
remote confines of  India, and the ideas were received with warm interest by the local faculty pres-
ent. A recent study seems to confirm my impression with regard to several common law and mixed 
jurisdictions, including India. Groppi and Ponthoreau, The use of  foreign precedents, 412-415, 428.
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result in country A. All of  which ought to be distinguished from a different, but 
related situation: where country A is part of  a regional human rights organisation 
governed by a human rights treaty, applied and enforced by a human rights court; 
in which case the supreme court of  country A is typically bound to abide by the 
case law of  that regional human rights court – as it happens in the European 
countries with the judgments of  the European Court of  Human Rights, to give 
one example.5 While in this latter situation the supreme court of  A is in some 
sense legally bound by a case law that is in a way “foreign” (the case law of  the 
European Court), with “judicial comparative constitutional law” the situation is 
significantly different, as the supreme court of  A will (sometimes) follow foreign 
law without being bound to do so at all.6
This article offers a basic theory of  both judicial and academic compara-
tive constitutional law and tries to provide a justification for it.7 To prepare the 
grounds for that theory Parts 1 and 2 focus on the US as an example for the fol-
lowing reasons.8 First, it is precisely in the US where comparative constitutional 
law has flourished most in the last few decades. This is unsurprising given that 
once something gets moving in that huge country reasons of  scale and avail-
ability of  resources make it likely that it will soon become the place in the world 
where that something will receive more attention – in our case comparative con-
stitutional law, but one could argue that soccer will be next. Second, whether 
one likes it or not, the US constitutional system is the forerunner of  many oth-
ers and is, at the same time, a recurrent object of  praise or criticism. Moreover, 
many of  the important comparative constitutional questions have been brought 
to the limelight by the American controversy on comparative constitutional law; 
so by focusing on this debate one delves simultaneously, to some extent, into the 
5 As it is well known, the extent to which it is true that the courts of  the European countries are 
actually bound by the decisions of  the Strasbourg court differs as a result of  domestic norms and 
practices. See e.g., for the case of  the UK, Section 2, Human Rights Act (2008).
6 As Neuman explains, these two situations are oftentimes confused, although they are quite differ-
ent. Neuman GL, ‘International law as a resource in constitutional interpretation’ 30 Harvard Journal 
of  Law and Public Policy (2006) 177, 177-180. Like Professor McCrudden “I am interested in the use 
of  foreign human rights law, not international human rights law, nor foreign human rights law that 
purports to be interpretative of  international human rights law (although clearly there is a close 
connection in some cases).” McCrudden C, ‘A common law of  human rights: Transnational judicial 
conversations on constitutional rights’ 20 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 499, (2000), 510.
7 Some time ago I offered a first version of  this theory in an article written in Spanish together with 
my Chilean colleague Orrego C, ‘Los usos del derecho constitucional comparado y la universalidad 
de los derechos humanos’ 88 Revista Española De Derecho Constitucional 11 (2010).
8 It is of  course only an example, without prejudice to European contributions to the field, that are 
perhaps more traditional and better known, partly in connection to the phenomenon of  the Euro-
pean Union and its predecessors.
Towards a New Justificatory Theory of Comparative Constitutional Law
93Strathmore Law JournaL, June 2015
equivalent controversies and discussions in other jurisdictions. Third, given the 
aim of  this piece – to query the justification of  comparative constitutional law – 
I find it advisable to concentrate in one jurisdiction rather than dispersing one’s 
efforts across several. The Latin saying “non multa sed multum” that captures the 
essence of  the distinction between the English words “many and much” com-
mends this approach.
Part 3 offers a basic theory of  the reasonable use of  foreign materials in 
constitutional adjudication. While not fully original my theory is necessary in 
order to introduce the next, crucial section, where I seek the justification of  
comparative constitutionalism. Part 4 contends that the theory of  comparative 
constitutional law only holds full meaning and sense if  coupled with the accept-
ance of  the universality of  fundamental human rights. This contention finds its 
most prominent application in the area of  rights adjudication. If, contrariwise, 
one denies the universality of  fundamental human rights the comparative enter-
prise becomes unintelligible – which, as will be seen, is not akin to affirming that 
it becomes impossible as a matter of  fact. At the same time it will be argued that 
moral relativism is incompatible with the above-mentioned universality and, also, 
that the latter is best explained by the acknowledgment that certain truths about 
the human person have an objectivity and evidence that cannot be proved. These 
truths have been traditionally captured by the name “natural law” and have been 
elaborated by the classical thinking that opposed moral relativism, and expanded 
in recent times by the new classical natural law theory. Finally, Part 5 provides a 
counter example by showing an instance of  misuse of  comparative constitution-
al analysis and by issuing a warning regarding the prevention of  similar abuses.
Academic Comparative Constitutional Law
The debate related in the introduction is in itself  culturally iconic.9 But in 
the US interest in foreign law – and in comparative law as a method of  analysis 
and research– springs from the conclusion of  the Second World War at the lat-
est. A clear indication of  that interest is the sponsorship that the Association 
of  American Law Schools (AALS) – a non-profit organisation gathering most 
law schools in the US – awarded in 1948 to the meeting of  the “Institute in 
9 As Adam Liptak argued in The New York Times in 2008, “citations to foreign and international law in 
recent Supreme Court decisions ignited an enormous furor in Congress and in the popular conscious-
ness.” ‘US Court is now guiding fewer nations’ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.
html?hp=&adxnnlx=1221750684x/TQo9BGKg/1OAw%20yvju8A&pagewanted=print, on 19 
December 2013.
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the Teaching of  International and Comparative Law”. In his trailblazing 1950 
article “Comparative and Foreign Law in American Schools,”10 John Stevenson 
describes in detail the Institute’s meeting. The article includes an appendix with a 
list showing that by then twenty six law schools already offered courses in general 
comparative law. When thirty years later Stewart Schwab – the present Dean of  
Cornell Law School – took a teaching position at Cornell, he noticed that the law 
school’s curriculum included some eight classes with comparative themes, typi-
cally European community law. In 2013 – more or less sixty years after Steven-
son’s research – Dean Schwab reported that the number of  comparative courses 
at Cornell had more than trebled: out of  150 classes offered some 30 had com-
parative themes, comprising roughly 20% of  the Law School’s curriculum.11
What about comparative constitutional law? Perhaps on account of  some 
temperamental insularity inherited from the British, which generated what Ack-
erman has labeled “constitutional provincialism,”12 the idea of  comparative anal-
ysis took more time to fly in the American constitutional domain. But in recent 
times the new comparative wave has also washed the constitutional shores – both 
the academic and the judicial ones. The transformation has been so significant 
that it would be quite fair to acknowledge that regarding comparative constitu-
tional law the US is today the main experimental lab in the whole world: where 
the pros and cons of  the comparative venture as applied to the constitutional 
field are more deeply explored; where the main questions – the very questions 
that are similarly relevant for the same comparative inquiry elsewhere – are ex-
amined and dissected.
I will now display two important indicators showing that comparative con-
stitutional law as an academic discipline is booming in North America. First, the 
significant number of  law schools that offer not just comparative courses but 
more specifically comparative constitutional law courses, under several names 
(though for the most part they are just called that: “Comparative Constitutional 
Law”). A non-exhaustive list speaks of  some 36 schools, including the likes of  
10 Stevenson JR, 50 Columbia Law Review, (1950) 613, 623-628 
11 Schwab SJ, speech at the Third Annual Meeting of  the Law Schools Global League, a Conference on 
Globalisation of  Legal Education and Legal Profession, Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat, India, 
27-28 February 2013. Personal notes on file with the author.
12 Ackerman B, ‘The rise of  world constitutionalism’ 83 Virginia Law Review (1997) 771, 773-774. See 
also Harding SK, ‘Comparative reasoning and judicial review’ 28 Yale Journal of  International Law 
(2003) 409, 417-423 for a good account of  what she calls constitutional “isolationism”. Ackerman’s 
own expression is a close cousin to “exceptionalism”. In the words of  Eric Posner, “American 
exceptionalism [is the] view going back 200 years […] that we’ve figured it out and people should 
follow our lead.” Interview quoted by Liptak, New York Times (2008) above.
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Yale, Harvard, Columbia, Chicago, New York University (NYU), Penn, Cornell, 
Georgetown, Notre Dame, Boston University, Boston College, American Uni-
versity, Fordham and Virginia.13 Yale offered at one time as many as four differ-
ent courses on topics akin to comparative constitutional analysis.14 Furthermore, 
some law schools that offer their students a summer program of  studies abroad 
typically include “Comparative Constitutional Law” in their program’s curricu-
lum.15 Finally, the rise of  the discipline is also reflected in the activities of  the 
above mentioned Association of  American Law Schools, whose 2008 mid-year 
meeting featured in the limelight “alternative constitutionalisms” – including 
“comparative constitutional law”.16
Secondly, it is striking how many quality books on comparative constitu-
tional law have been published in the US in the last few years.17 Top scholars 
such as Mauro Cappeletti, Norman Dorsen, Karl Loewenstein, Walter Murphy, 
Giovanni Sartori, Vicki Jackson, and Mark Tushnet – all of  them from the US or 
based therein – have written one or more volumes on the topic. Another non-
exhaustive list, this time of  books and treatises published in the US exclusively 
devoted to the discipline, includes twenty, most of  which appeared early in the 
third millennium.18 On top of  this, one ought to count as well the huge number 
of  law review articles devoted to comparative constitutional analysis.19 Finally, 
one ought to count too the fact that in 2003 a group of  renowned scholars 
13 By way of  confirmation of  the trend illustrated supra, it is worth noting what the president of  the 
AALS signaled in her annual 2001 message: “in an AALS Curriculum Survey done a short time ago, 
it was found that the single largest growth areas by far in law school curricula in the last five years 
has been in the international and comparative law fields.” http://www.aals.org/presidentsmessages/
pmnov01.html, on 7 January 2014.
14 The relevant courses offered by Yale Law School in 2013 were Comparative Constitutional Law, 
Comparative Administrative Law, Comparative History of  Human Rights and European Conven-
tion on Human Rights: Selected Problems. See http://www.yale.edu/printer/bulletin/htmlfiles/
law/course-offerings.html, on 8 January 2014.
15 Two such examples, with which I’m familiar, given that their summer programs take place in my 
country, Argentina, are Louisiana State University’s Law Center and Valparaiso University Law 
School but there are many more.
16 See http://www.aals.org/events_2008constitutionalwhy.php, on 8 January 2014.
17 It has been recently pointed out that “once a relatively obscure and exotic subject studied by the de-
voted few, comparative constitutionalism has become one of  the more fashionable subjects in contem-
porary legal scholarship.” Hirschl R, ‘Editorial’ 11 International Journal on Constitutional Law 1 (2013) 1, 2.
18 Those most in vogue are Jackson VC and Tushnet M, Comparative constitutional law, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, (2006) and Dorsen N, Rosenfeld M, Sajó A, Baer S, Comparative constitutionalism, (2010).
19 Those articles include, among many others, one directly on point by a current Supreme Court Jus-
tice. See Ginsburg RB, ‘Looking beyond our borders: The value of  a comparative perspective in 
constitutional adjudication’ 22 Yale Law and Policy Review (2004) 329. See also Breyer S, ‘Constitu-
tionalism, privatization and globalization: Changing relationships among European constitutional 
courts’ 21 Cardozo Law Review (2005) 1045.
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founded the International Journal of  Constitutional Law (I•CON). It is published by 
Oxford University Press in association with NYU and it is, to a large extent, 
dedicated to comparative constitutional law.
Judicial Comparative Constitutional Law
It is a truth widely acknowledged that US courts have traditionally ignored 
the jurisprudence of  foreign courts in constitutional matters.20 This has changed 
in recent times, when the debate on the use of  foreign law in those matters 
gained currency in the Supreme Court, partly in light – and, presumably, partly as 
a consequence – of  the academic developments accounted for in the preceding 
section. Not only have Supreme Justices actually debated in public on the topic 
(and written about it too),21 but also since the new millennium several Supreme 
Court cases have dealt point-blank with what I have called here judicial com-
parative constitutional law. Even before those cases were decided, however, there 
had been some concurring and dissenting opinions examining deliberately and 
reflexively the possibility of  the use of  foreign materials in constitutional adju-
dication. It is, for instance, commonplace to refer to the 1958 plurality opinion 
in Trop v. Dulles’ allusion to the practice of  “the civilized nations of  the world,”22 
later quoted with recognition of  its authority by the majority of  the Supreme 
Court in two of  the key third millennium cases.23 Much later, it is worth recalling 
the dissents by Justice Breyer in Printz v. United States24 (1997) and in the denial of  
certiorari in Knight v. Florida25 (1999), coupled with the famous critical rebukes by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, respectively.26
Notwithstanding these forerunners, the real action exploded in three more 
recent cases, two on capital punishment – Atkins v. Virginia27 and Roper v. Sim-
20 Calabresi and Zimdahl try to controvert the view that United States’ courts have traditionally ignored 
the jurisprudence of  foreign courts in constitutional matters, but in the end they recognise that 
the way the debate has been framed in recent times is novel. Calabresi SG and Zimdahl SD, ‘The 
Supreme Court and foreign sources of  law: Two hundred years of  practice and the juvenile death 
penalty decision’ 47 William and Mary Law Review (2005) 743, 755.
21 See Ginsburg, ‘Looking beyond our borders’; Breyer, ‘Constitutionalism, privatization and globaliza-
tion’.
22 Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 102 (1958) (Warren, CJ for plurality).
23 Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304, 311 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551, 561, 575 (2005).
24 521 US 898, 976 (1997), Justice Breyer dissenting.
25 528 US 990, 993 (1999), Justice Breyer dissenting in the denial of  certiorari.
26 Printz, 521 US at 921, n.11 (Scalia, J.) and Knight, 528 US at 990 (Thomas, J.).
27 536 US 304 (2002).
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mons– 28 and a third one on the criminalisation of  sodomy – Lawrence v. Texas.29 
Given that the relevant lines in the latter case are substantially included in the 
former two I will focus on those, without prejudice to pertinent references to 
Lawrence (and other cases) when appropriate. Albeit briefly I will also address 
the even more recent case Graham v. Florida,30 where some of  the newer justices 
joined the battlefield if  only by substantially adhering to what had already been 
established by their colleagues in the forerunning cases. I should make clear from 
the outset that my aim is neither to reinvent the wheel nor to make complete and 
conclusive argumentative claims about the US Supreme Court’s use of  foreign 
law: there is a vast literature discussing the merits of  the majority and minority 
positions within the Court in these three cases and it is not my intention here to 
be redundant. On the contrary, my survey is limited to what is strictly necessary 
for the development of  the theory that I will sketch in the following sections.
In 2002, the Supreme Court overruled its 1989 decision in Penry v. Linaugh31 
where a slim majority had ruled that the execution of  the mentally retarded did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.32 
In Atkins v. Virginia33 the Court decided the opposite, by a 6-3 vote, considering 
that the “standards of  decency that mark the progress of  a maturing society” had 
evolved since Penry.34 After noting that the practice of  the States regarding capital 
punishment in these situations “has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that 
a national [legislative] consensus has developed against it,”35 the majority added 
some remarkable language in its landmark footnote 21:
28 543 US 551 (2005).
29 539 US 558 (2003). The same year Lawrence was decided two cases on affirmative action touched the 
topic at stake in this article, though only by passing and in a less significant fashion. See Grutter v. Bol-
linger 539 US 306, 330 (majority opinion) and 344 (Ginsburg, J, joined by Breyer, J, concurring) and 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 US 244, 298-305 (2003) (Ginsburg, J, joined in part by Souter, J., concurring).
30 560 US 48 (2010).
31 492 US 302 (1989), per O’Connor, J. The majority regarding this part of  the opinion also included 
Rehnquist, CJ, and White, Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.
32 “Mentally retarded” but capable of  committing a crime according to the determination of  a jury. See 
Penry, 492 US at 330-333 (majority opinion).
33 Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304 (2002), per Stevens, J. (overruling Penry v Linaugh, 492 US 302 (1989)). 
The majority regarding this part of  the opinion also included O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg 
and Breyer, JJ. In their dissenting opinion Chief  Justice Renhquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas 
expressed the view that Penry ought to be upheld. As it is quite apparent, in 2002 two Justices 
changed their mind from 1989: O’Connor and Kennedy, who were in the majority of  Penry and are 
also in the majority of  the overruling case Atkins.
34 Atkins, 536 US, 312.
35 Atkins, 316.
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Additional evidence makes it clear that this legislative judgment reflects a much broader 
social and professional consensus. […]36 Moreover, within the world community, the im-
position of  the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is over-
whelmingly disapproved.37
The Court went on to say that these factors, which include the prevailing practice 
in the world community, are “by no means dispositive;” and that they were only 
resorted to because “their consistency with the legislative evidence lends further 
support to our conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have ad-
dressed the issue.”38 Nevertheless, this clear reference to foreign law and practice, 
though confined to a relatively short footnote, elicited an enraged reply from the 
dissenting Justices.
For Chief  Justice Rehnquist, the resort to foreign sources with a view to 
determining the constitutional question at stake is not supported by precedent. 
Moreover, the Chief  Justice (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) objected that 
he failed to see “how the views of  other countries regarding the punishment 
of  their citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate determination.”39 
In his separate dissent, joined by the other two, Justice Scalia went further: the 
practices of  the “world community” are not only irrelevant but their “notions of  
justice are (thankfully) not always those of  our people”.40
36 In the part omitted in the text the Court notices that “several organizations with germane exper-
tise have adopted official positions opposing the imposition of  the death penalty upon a mentally 
retarded offender” and provides a few examples such as some medical associations and religious 
communities. Atkins at 316, n 21.
37 Atkins at 316, n 21. In support of  the view that the world community disapproves capital punish-
ment for the mentally ill the court notices next, always within note 21, a brief  for European Union 
as amicus curiae. Likewise, a year later, in Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558, 576 (2003), the Court looked 
again at Europe: the majority there invoked decisions of  the European Court on Human Rights in 
search of  “values we share with a wider civilisation” to support its own view regarding the prohibi-
tion of  sodomy.
38 Atkins, 536 US at 316, n.21.
39 Atkins at 324. In Lawrence the dissent opined in a similar vein that “the Court’s discussion of  these 
foreign views (ignoring, of  course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on 
sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta.” Lawrence, 539 US at 598 (Scalia J, joined by Rehnquist CJ 
and Thomas, J).
40 Atkins, 536 US at 348. In Lawrence Justice Scalia, citing Justice Thomas in Foster, added on top of  
this that these are “dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court […] should not impose foreign 
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’” Lawrence, at 598, citing Foster v Florida, 537 US 990, n (2002) 
(Thomas J, concurring in denial of  certiorari). A few years later, Justice Scalia insisted ironically in 
replying to a dissent by Justice Stevens’: “No determination of  what rights the Constitution of  the 
United States covers would be complete, of  course, without a survey of  what other countries do.” 
McDonald v Chicago, 561 US (2010) (slip opinion at 10). See also the plurality opinion in this case on 
what Justice Scalia calls the “follow-the-foreign-crowd requirement”. McDonald, plurality opinion, 
(slip opinion at 34-35, and nn. 28-29).
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Note 21 of  the majority opinion in Atkins, coupled with the replies by the 
dissenters, became the first round of  what was to become the modern fight 
around judicial comparative constitutional law. We will now consider the next 
episode of  the saga, again in the context of  capital punishment.
In Stanford v. Kentucky41 the Supreme Court had held, in a vein similar to Pen-
ry v. Linaugh, and in the same year (1989), that the imposition of  capital punish-
ment on a juvenile delinquent did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment. As with Penry, the Court overruled Stanford: in 
2005 a new majority – quite similar to the one in Atkins v. Virginia, and similarly 
slim – 42 reasoned in Roper v. Simmons43 that the practice of  the states had evolved 
since 1989 – again, along similar lines to the reasoning of  the majority in Atkins.
According to Justice Kennedy’s lead vote, by 2005 there were “objective 
indicia of  consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of  legislatures 
that have addressed the question.”44 Furthermore, the majority of  the Court’s 
own independent judgment, which was also brought to bear on the matter, was 
too that “the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.”45 In 
this context of  the judgment of  the reasonableness of  the death penalty as ap-
plied to juveniles, the Court navigates again the waters of  judicial comparative 
constitutional law. But what in Atkins had been confined to a footnote, occupies 
a whole section of  the majority opinion in Roper.46
In section IV of  its opinion in Roper the Court attempts to explain its re-
sorting to foreign authorities in this area of  the law. First, to do so is “instructive” 
although “[t]his reality does not become controlling, for the task of  interpreting 
the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.”47 Second, it is proper to 
acknowledge “the overwhelming weight of  international opinion against the ju-
venile death penalty”48 for while the former does not control the case’s outcome, 
it “does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”49 
41 492 US 361 (1989), per Scalia, J. The relevant majority in Stanford is the same as in Penry: Rehnquist, 
CJ and White, O’Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.
42 The majority vote was signed by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. It is note-
worthy that Justice Kennedy had been in the majority of  Stanford, the case overruled by Roper, a 
decision where, furthermore, he is the author of  the opinion of  the Court.
43 543 US 551 (2005).
44 Roper, 543 US at 552. See also Roper 567 and 574.
45 Roper at 564.
46 Roper section IV, the last one.
47 Roper at 575.
48 Roper at 578.
49 Roper at 578, emphasis added.
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Third, “the express affirmation of  certain fundamental rights by other nations 
and peoples simply underscores the centrality of  those same rights within our 
own heritage of  freedom.”50
In reply, a furious dissent by Justice Scalia5151 denies this purported justifi-
cation and challenges the seriousness of  the majority’s reasoning. According to 
the dissent, what the Court has really done, while denying doing so, is granting 
foreign law controlling authority in the Roper case. The basic premise of  the ma-
jority’s opinion would have really been that the laws of  the US should conform 
to the laws of  the rest of  the world.52 Next, Justice Scalia critically targets the 
Court’s allegedly selective use of  foreign law: while it resorts to it here in Roper it 
ignores it in other areas of  the law – he offers abortion as an example – where, 
perhaps, the outcome favoured by foreign law would be less congenial with the 
Court’s views.53 But “[t]o invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, 
and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry.”54
In 2010 the Court revisited our topic in Graham v. Florida.55 This time the 
question at stake was a related one, always within the neighbourhood of  the Eight 
Amendment: whether juvenile offenders can be sentenced to life imprisonment 
without parole for nonhomicide crimes. In line with Roper, which, as we know, 
had excluded the death penalty for such offenders, in Graham a similarly divided 
Court held that the imposition of  capital punishment in those cases constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Kennedy wrote again the majority opin-
ion, which was also signed by the three other Justices whom, having signed Roper 
five years earlier, remained in the Court in 2010: Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg.56 
50 Roper at 578.
51 Roper at 607 Chief  Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent. Note that 
two months prior to the decision in Roper v Simmons Justice Scalia had debated with Justice Breyer on 
the use of  foreign law by the Supreme Court, as recalled in the Introduction, supra. Justice Scalia’s 
views in Roper are certainly coherent with the ones expressed earlier at the debate. In fact the latter 
may serve as an interpretative tool to read the former. Justice O’Connor dissented separately. Roper 
at 587.
52 Roper at 624.
53 Roper at 625. Along the same lines now Chief  Justice Roberts stated during his confirmation hear-
ing that “looking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your 
friends.” Liptak, ‘US Court is now guiding fewer nations’ note 7.
54 Roper, 543 US at 627.
55 560 US 48 (2010).
56 In 2008 Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg (together with Justice Souter, who was still in the 
Court) had also joined an opinion by Justice Kennedy on a related topic. In Kennedy v Louisiana, 554 
US 407 (2008) a similarly divided Court held, along lines similar to those discussed in this section 
(but without resorting to comparative arguments) that capital punishment as applied to the rape of  
a child is unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment.
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Justice Sotomayor, who had replaced Justice Souter, volunteered the fifth vote 
and by so doing endorsed the substance of  judicial comparative constitutional 
law as it had been expounded in Atkins, Roper, and Lawrence.
It is unnecessary to go deep into Graham here, given that there isn’t much 
in the majority opinion that had not been present in the prior cases.57 Along the 
same lines of  his opinion in Roper, and quoting it to remind us of  the confirma-
tory role of  comparative constitutional law,58 Justice Kennedy observes in the 
newer case that the sentencing practice considered unconstitutional is rejected 
the world over; and that this observation is supportive of  the Court’s conclusion 
though it does not control it.59 Interestingly, while quoting Atkins, Roper, and their 
forerunners to support the Court’s resort to foreign sources in Graham, Justice 
Kennedy indicates that, at least in this area, judicial comparative constitutional 
law is a “longstanding practice.” The opinion concludes with another reminder in 
the way of  a quite solemn ratification of  the non-controlling, confirmatory role:
The Court has treated the laws and practices of  other nations and international agreements 
as relevant to the Eight Amendment not because those norms are binding or controlling 
but because the judgment of  the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is 
inconsistent with basic principles of  decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale has 
respected reasoning to support it.60
The dissent, authored by Justice Thomas, is doubly interesting. On the one 
hand, it is the first time Justice Thomas writes an opinion about this, having in 
the past subscribed the dissenting views of  Chief  Justice Rehnquist (in Atkins) 
and of  Justice Scalia (in Atkins and Roper).61
What he writes on our topic is skeptical, short and sharp, and deliberately 
confined to a footnote. For Justice Thomas the Court’s discussion of  foreign 
laws is but one chapter of  its judicial fiat, given that “past opinions explain at 
57 The Court applied to the issue at stake the test in Roper, i.e. whether there is a national consensus 
against the practice (section III, A of  the majority opinion), and next exercised its own independent 
judgment about whether the punishment is cruel and unusual (section III, B). While concluding 
that it is cruel and unusual in exercise of  its judgment, the Court ventured into judicial comparative 
constitutional law in a way pretty much identical to the one in section IV of  the majority opinion in 
Roper (section III, D).
58 For instance 560 US 48 (2010) (slip opinion at 31).
59 560 US 48 (2010) (slip opinion at 4). “The judgments of  other nations and the international com-
munity are not dispositive as to the meaning of  the Eighth Amendment.”
60 560 US 48 (2010) (slip opinion at 31).
61 Justice Thomas had, however, penned a brief, but significant, concurrence in a denial of  certiorari: 
Foster v Florida, 537 US 990, n (2002) (Thomas J concurring in denial of  certiorari).
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length why such factors are irrelevant to the meaning of  our Constitution.”62 
The reference to relevance is in stark contrast with the majority’s view that “‘the 
climate of  international opinion concerning the acceptability of  a particular pun-
ishment’ [is] ‘not irrelevant’”.63
On the other hand, given that Justice Alito joins Justice Thomas’s dissent 
(as well as does Justice Scalia) we now know that Alito – another absentee in the 
first rounds of  this battle – is with the dissenting team. It is also worth noting, 
by way of  contrast, that Chief  Justice Roberts – who also had not yet joined 
the Court when Roper and the other important cases had been decided– did not 
speak to the question of  judicial comparative constitutional law in his opinion 
concurring in the judgment.64 Regardless of  the merits of  the judgments in these 
cases, the opinions in Atkins v. Virginia and, especially, Roper v. Simmons (and 
Graham v. Florida), contain the seeds for a justificatory theory of  judicial compara-
tive constitutional law. I will therefore try next, in section 3, to condense such a 
theory in order to prepare the way for the crucial section 5.
Towards a Theory of the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional 
Adjudication
First, we must carve out the question at stake. The question is not whether 
a constitutional convention or an ordinary legislature may use foreign law when 
determining constitutional affairs and arrangements through enactments – what 
we could label legislative comparative constitutional law. Indeed hardly anyone 
objects to the legitimacy of  that practice; and certainly some of  the main par-
ticipants in the debate examined in this paper do not object to it. Justice Scalia’s 
dictum, writing for the majority in Printz v. United States, is crystal clear: “We 
62 560 US 48 (2010) (slip opinion at n 11). Justice Thomas, dissenting, quoting Chief  Justice’s Rehnquist 
dissent in Atkins.
63 560 US 48 (2010) (slip opinion at 29), quoting a footnote in Enmund v Florida 458 US 782, 796, n. 22 
(1982).
64 560 US 48 (2010) (slip opinion at 1). Justice Kagan, who joined the Court after Graham had been 
decided, expressed some of  her views on comparative constitutional law during her confirmation 
hearings. “I’m in favor of  good ideas [. . .] wherever you can get them.” […] “Having an awareness 
of  what other Nations are doing […] might be useful […].” She also observed that on a point of  
US law foreign decisions do not rank as precedent, but they could be informative in much the same 
way as one might gain knowledge or insight from reading a law review article. The nomination of  Elena 
Kagan to be an associate justice of  the Supreme Court of  the United States: Hearing on S. Hrg. 111-1044 Before 
the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate (2010).
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think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of  interpreting a con-
stitution, though it was of  course quite relevant to the task of  writing one.”65 
Although this is likely a historical judgment referring to the US Constitution, it 
is reasonable to read some (positive) evaluation into the description. As one of  
Justice Scalia’s long time companions in rejecting the use of  judicial comparative 
constitutional law put it, “Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the ac-
tions of  other nations on any issue it likes.”66
Legislative use of  foreign constitutional legal materials is quite unproblematic 
because legislatures are free from the constraints that ordinarily bind judges; in 
the first place the constraint posed by the law itself, which can be the object 
of  legislative, but not (usually) judicial, reform. Furthermore, even when 
legislative action is not per se reformative, legislating well requires the legislator to 
continually make discretional judgments that involve not only reasonableness but 
also efficacy and efficiency. In carrying out these judgments it is all but natural 
that the legislator would look abroad. For example if  the legislator faces a given 
problem (x), and the same (or a similar) problem (x) has been faced and met 
successfully by the legislature of  some neighbouring country it would be both 
intelligent and unobjectionable to look at their solution.
Jeremy Waldron offers the following analogical example:
Consider how we would expect our public health authorities to deal with a new disease or 
epidemic appearing within our borders. It would be ridiculous to say that because this prob-
lem had arisen in the United States, we should look only to American science to solve it. On 
the contrary, we would want to look abroad to see what scientific conclusions and strategies 
had emerged, had been tested, and had been mutually validated in the public health practices 
of  other countries.67
Nevertheless, efficacy and successful tackling of  problems are normally 
outside the typical scope of  the judicial function. In the US this is also true in 
relation to constitutional rights adjudication, at least in principle, given the fairly 
traditional conception of  the separation between legislative and adjudicative au-
thority, a conception that still holds by and large. The same is true about other 
countries following the American constitutional model.68
65 Printz, 521 US at 921, n 11.
66 Foster v Florida, 537 US 990, n (2002) (Thomas, J concurring in denial of  certiorari).
67 Waldron J, ‘Foreign law and the modern ius gentium’, 119 Harvard Law Review (2005) 129, 143.
68 A good example is the Constitution of  Argentina (1853), basically modeled after the Constitution of  US 
(1787).
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Waldron simplifies too much the question when he treats together legisla-
tive and judicial uses of  foreign constitutional law as if  there were a continu-
um.69 What happens at a pre-legislative (or pre-constitutional as the case may 
be) stage ought to be distinguished from the use of  foreign constitutional law in 
adjudication – normally at a later stage, coming into place only once the relevant 
provision has been legislatively enacted.70 It is this isolated question the one we 
will focus on now, when we consider “whether comparative constitutional law is 
justified.”71
The US Constitution, like most constitutions,72 is silent about this point. 
Yet I think that judges are morally justified to use foreign law in constitutional 
adjudication. While the ultimate reasons for this proposition will be developed in 
section 5 (below), I will explain here three caveats that must obtain for that use to 
be valid. As already anticipated, the seeds of  this basic theory are already present 
in section IV of  the majority opinion in Roper v. Simmons.73
Firstly, comparative constitutional law has a confirmatory role: comparative 
analysis is useful in order to ratify the reasonableness of  a given national norm 
or practice.74 Of  course this analysis (and its virtuality) depends on the existence 
69 Waldron comments that “the idea of  the law of  nations makes itself  available to law-makers and judges 
as an established body of  legal insight […]” also at 133, emphasis added. Similarly, Justice Breyer con-
flates legislation and adjudication in the following dictum: “Just as ‘attention to the judgment of  other 
nations’ can help Congress determine ‘the justice and propriety of  [America’s] measures’, Madison 
J, The Federalist No. 63, C. Rossiter Edition, 196, 382 so it can help guide this Court when it decides 
whether a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.” Foster v Florida, 537 US 990, 993 
(Breyer, J, dissenting in denial of  certiorari). For Justice Thomas’ rebuke see supra text to note 53.
70 The exceptions to the timing described in the text are the a priori systems of  judicial review. See 
Guarnieri C & Pederzoli P, The power of  judges, (2002) 143; and see generally Cappelletti M, The judicial 
process in comparative perspective (1989).
71 In this respect my interest is similar to Professor McCrudden’s who stated in a seminal article: “I am 
mostly concerned in what follows with what happens after human rights legislation, or constitutional 
human rights provisions, have been introduced.” McCrudden, ‘A common law of  human rights’, 501 (2000).
72 Some constitutions expressly permit the citation of  foreign law when interpreting the Bill of  Rights. 
Article 39 (1) (c) Constitution of  South Africa (1996).
73 543 US 551 (2005). Others have already contributed with the clarification of  constraints that ought 
to be added to the three mentioned in the text. For example, Amann rightly points out two criteria 
that already may be discerned in the Court’s jurisprudence pre-Roper: “others must have considered 
the issue at hand in comparable circumstances; and those other decisions must derive from nations 
or systems that share with the United States a constitutive commitment to fundamental rights.” 
Amann DM, ‘Raise the flag and let it talk: On the use of  external norms in constitutional decision 
making’ 2 International Journal on Constitutional Law 4 (2004) 597, 598. Both criteria underscore “anal-
ogy”, a key factor in the context – different but analogical – of  common law reasoning. See Cross R 
and Harris JW, Precedent in English law (1991).
74 “The opinion of  the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected 
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.” Roper, 543 US, 578, emphasis added.
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of  such a national norm or practice and cannot substitute for it. For example, in 
Roper Justice O’Connor dissented not because she would not use foreign law in 
some constitutional cases75 but because in her view the mentioned prerequisite 
did not obtain in that particular case: “I do not believe that a genuine national 
consensus against the juvenile death penalty has yet developed […] [Therefore] 
I can assign no such confirmatory role to the international consensus described 
by the Court.”76 Regardless of  its concrete application to Roper the idea is good: 
the invocation of  foreign law ought not to serve as an excuse to replace a valid 
norm or practice for the judge’s own preferences; nor does it have the aptitude 
to transform in reasonable what is not.77 Judicial constitutional law ought not to 
become the law of  rationalisation. In section 6 (below) I will provide one exam-
ple of  such rationalisation through the misapplication of  comparative analysis.
Secondly, the use of  foreign constitutional law has an educational role: com-
parative analysis is undertaken partly with a view to understanding and explaining 
better one’s own legal system in a particular area of  the law. When one learns a 
foreign language one typically learns more about one’s own language; one realises 
that solutions that were thought to be given are actually mere possibilities. Like-
wise, relevant foreign constitutional law can illuminate the scope of  one’s own 
legal system.78 It can therefore be highly informative and instructive for the judge.
From the confirmatory and educational roles of  comparative constitutional 
law follows, thirdly, that its use ought to be always obiter dictum: judicial constitu-
tional reasoning may not rely solely on foreign sources that are not recognised 
by the constitution of  the country as valid law. Those sources, while informative, 
do not control the outcome.79 This is not, however, to underestimate the role of  
comparative analysis. If  the point is to reach sound constitutional legal conclu-
sions (on questions especially where there is no settled constitutional answer), 
75 Indeed, she would use foreign law sometimes: “I disagree with Justice Scalia’s contention, post, 15-
22 (dissenting opinion), that foreign and international law have no place in our Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.” Roper, 543 US, 604.
76 Roper O’Connor, J, dissenting emphases in the original.
77 As Carozza states, “mere numerical consensus does not, per se, provide a sufficient foundation for 
making conclusive jugdments regarding the content of  human rights norms”. Carozza PG, “‘My 
friend is a stranger’: The death penalty and the global ius commune of  human rights” 81 Texas Law 
Review (2003)1031, 1078-1079. See also, Waldron J, ‘Foreign law and the modern ius gentium’, 139: “a 
consensus in either the law or the natural sciences can be wrong”.
78 Someone who is quite skeptic on this score recognises, however, that “looking abroad may help us 
see our own constitutional scheme in a new light, and this, in turn, may lead to results that would not 
have occurred without resort to foreign materials”. Rosenkrantz CF, ‘Against borrowings and other 
non-authoritative uses of  foreign law’ 1 International Journal on Constitutional Law 2 (2003) 269, 288.
79 Roper, 543 US, 578.
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then the proper understanding of  the foreign material will quite rightly feature 
decisively – even if  not in a controlling fashion– in the line of  argument leading 
to the conclusion that (x) is the law.
The search for confirmation and instruction makes more sense in some 
areas of  constitutional law than in others. For the reasons I will offer next the 
search is especially meaningful when it comes to the determination of  the scope 
of  fundamental human rights (and indeed it seems to be the case that as a matter 
of  fact judges around the world have searched abroad more when it comes to 
those rights.80) Even though, as Posner points out, “the foreign court will not 
have been interpreting the same constitutional or statutory text or precedents that 
would frame and guide the analysis by the US court”,81 it is true, nevertheless, that 
in some cases concerning fundamental rights the moral reasoning will be similar 
in every jurisdiction. For as Finnis puts it, providing a couple of  examples, “[o]ur 
law against euthanasia and assisting suicide appropriately has virtually the same 
content as the natural moral law against such choices and actions, and debates 
about its positing (about enacting or retaining it) substantially track moral debate 
about the morality of  those kinds of  choice and act”.82 Finnis’s reference to 
natural moral law in this context anticipates my argument in the next section. 
For the time being it will suffice to underline that in cases such as those of  his 
examples legal reasoning and moral reasoning overlap to a significant extent, 
turning less relevant the technicalities of  each given legal system.
It is worth noting, however, that the implicit distinction between funda-
mental human rights questions from what we could term “structural” questions 
(e.g. those concerning federalism, separation of  powers, and judicial review) is 
not always crystal clear.83 In the final analysis political and legal institutions – 
structures– are there precisely to protect and foster fundamental human rights. 
This has been rightly noted in the United States: “The genius of  the American 
Constitution lies in its use of  structural devices to preserve individual liberty.”84
80 Groppi and Ponthoreau, The use of  foreign precedents, 416-417.
81 Richard Posner, No thanks, we already have our own laws, Legal Affairs, July/August 2004, at 
http://legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp, on 26 January 2014.
82 Finnis J, ‘Coexisting normative orders? Yes, but no’ 57 American Journal of  Jurisprudence. (2012) 111, 
113.
83 Groppi, Ponthoreau, and their collaborators in an extensive field research noted as a matter of  fact 
what I state normatively in the text: “A clear division between these matters [fundamental human 
rights and structural] has not always been possible […].”. Groppi and Ponthoreau, The use of  foreign 
precedents, 416.
84 Calabresi SG and Rhodes KH, ‘The structural constitution: unitary executive, plural judiciary’ 105 
Harvard Law Review (1992)1153, 1155. In recent times the US Supreme Court has also noted this 
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Perhaps this is why structural topics are also within the ballpark, especially 
in the field of  academic comparative constitutional law, but sometimes too re-
garding its judicial version.85
Indeed the strong account of  the universality of  rights that I endorse in the 
next section, which includes the fundamental intelligibility of  the common good, 
calls for such a potential extension at least in some contexts.
Comparative Constitutionalism, Natural Law, and the Universality 
of Human Rights
“[O]n this kind of  an issue you’re asking a human question, and the Americans 
are human. […] I thought our people in this country are not that much different 
than people [in] other places.”86 Leaving aside the irony entailed by their predica-
tion of  humanity, these words of  Justice Breyer’s in his debate with Justice Scalia 
provide a promising starting point for a sound discussion of  the foundations of  
comparative constitutional law.
What kind of  an issue is Justice Breyer talking about? He wants to contrast 
what he calls “a human question” with more “arcane” matters, such as those of  
“contract law, where a different legal system might have given the same words 
[a] totally different application.”87 In the same vein, Justice O’Connor argued in 
Roper v. Simmons that while “‘American law is distinctive in many respects’, the 
American ‘understanding of  human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated 
from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other countries. On 
the contrary, we should not be surprised to find congruence between domestic 
and international values […].’”88
The bottom line of  Justice Breyer’ and Justice O’Connor’s assertions is 
that the search for confirmation and instruction in foreign law is particularly 
meaningful when it comes to the determination of  the scope of  fundamen-
tal human rights (although it is also meaningful regarding structural matters, 
for the reasons hinted in the last paragraph of  section 4, above.) Indeed, with 
connection between structure and rights with regard to one particular structural device: federalism: 
“Federalism secures the freedom of  the individual”. Bond v United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
85 Despite the prevalence of  judicial comparative constitutional law in fundamental human rights mat-
ters, “citations are not completely absent in institutional decisions.” Groppi and Ponthoreau, The use 
of  foreign precedents, 417.
86 From the debate referenced supra, note 1, emphasis added.
87 Id.
88 Roper, 543 US at 605, Justice O’Connor, dissenting.
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respect to those rights there is a certain convergence between the prevailing 
values of  the different nations, regardless of  whether they use or accept the 
term “human rights”. As Finnis argued in 1980 in his Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, anthropological surveys entitle us to assert confidently that some goods, 
values and principles are virtually universal.89 This convergence cannot be just 
chance;90 and it should not pass unnoticed with a view to the assessment of  the 
comparative enterprise, especially given that some of  those goods have been 
encapsulated in modern times in the notion of  human rights. Thus to predicate 
the universality of  the former is to predicate the universality of  those rights, or 
at least of  their fundamental core.
This sociological universality of  the core of  human rights – a presupposi-
tion of  comparative constitutional law, as I shall argue – is tied to a notion that 
is prior (though not in a chronological sense): natural law.91 As Carozza puts it 
“there are some implicit natural law premises operative in the phenomenon of  
cross-judicial discourse on human rights (as distinct from other substantive areas 
of  law).”92 Natural law too is purported to be universal in its basic core, though 
in a different, normative sense of  universality.93 The famous words of  Antigone 
about the unwritten laws of  Hades apply mutatis mutandis to natural law: “their 
life is not of  to-day or yesterday, but from all time, and no man knows when they 
were first put forth.”94
This is not the place for expounding a natural law theory. But it might be 
useful to borrow from one of  its contemporary proponents, according to whom 
natural law is about the acceptance of  “the objective value of  human reason and 
the objectivity of  what is good or evil regarding at least certain things that are 
89 Finnis J, Natural law and natural rights, 2ed (2011) 83-84; 97.
90 Groppi and Ponthoreau hint in the right direction when they too signal toward a likely absence of  
chance: “[…] an explanation of  frequent references to foreign precedents in this field is probably 
given by the universal character of  human rights.” Groppi and Ponthoreau, The use of  foreign precedents, 
416.
91 Though not without its own ambiguities, the term “objective critical morality” can substitute “natu-
ral law” in some contexts. As explained by Orrego, “natural” in “natural law” “does not mean some-
thing related to the physical world, but rather to the rational world of  human morality. Hence the 
distinction between merely conventional morality and critical morality also captures the basic idea 
that some things may be morally good, and just, regardless of  social conventions to the contrary.” 
Orrego C, ‘The relevance of  the central natural law tradition for cross-cultural comparison: philo-
sophical and systematic considerations’ 8 The Journal of  Comparative Law (2014), 32.
92 Carozza, ‘My friend is a stranger’, at 1082, emphasis in the original.
93 Finnis, Natural law and natural rights sections III-V.
94 Sophocles, The Antigone, Jebb R Transcript, 3ed, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 91 - emphasis 
added.
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basic human goods for all persons, regardless of  time or culture”95 – thus mak-
ing clear that, contrary to some commonplaces, the notion is not in itself  about 
Catholicism, or Aristotelian accounts of  nature, or inferring “ought” from “is.”
If  rightly understood natural law (under whatever name) is denied, and so 
is denied the normative universality of  human rights (under whatever name), 
then judicial comparative constitutionalism is rendered unintelligible. (Though, 
to avoid overreaching, I must haste to note that that is only true for those who 
really deny natural law; some people think they deny it, while they actually ac-
cept its concept even without knowing they do so: more on this later.96) Posner, 
a staunch critic of  the use of  foreign law in constitutional adjudication and of  
natural law sees this clearly when he points out that to cite foreign law as author-
ity “is to flirt with the discredited (I had thought) idea of  a universal natural 
law.”97 But discredit in itself  should not control the issue at stake. Discredited 
ideas are sometimes valid ideas. More importantly, in the field of  American con-
stitutional law there is a version of  natural law which has been, in my view, validly 
discredited as a constitutional theory. It has sometimes been called “natural law 
jurisprudence” and, as is well known, it has been traced to early decisions of  the 
US Supreme Court that regularly relied on supposed natural law concepts (under 
different names!), sometimes to the expense of  the written Constitution.98
When the theory revived, disguised as substantive due process jurispru-
dence, during the Lochner era, and later again with the Warren Court (and 
in some, more recent cases too),99 it triggered similar criticisms of  resurrect-
ing natural law.100 But this is not the natural law I have in mind in this paper 
when I suggest that natural law (under whatever name) is the best foundation 
for the rational possibility of  comparative constitutionalism. Indeed, as Alford 
has remarked natural law jurisprudence qua constitutional theory is compatible 
with (and sometimes even adheres to) a version of  relativism that denies moral 
truth.101 Nothing could be further from the view supported in this paper than this 
95 Orrego, ‘The relevance of  the central natural law tradition’, at 34.
96 See text to note 108 infra.
97 Posner, ‘No thanks’.
98 Alford RP, ‘In search of  a theory for constitutional comparativism’ 52 University of  California, Los 
Angeles Law Review (2005) 639, 660-66 (citing Supreme Court decisions from the early years).
99 The concept of  “implicit ordered liberty” has been cited numerous times in substantive due process 
jurisprudence of  recent years. For example, from Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 500 (1961) on-
wards, see Alford, ‘In search of  a theory of  constitutional comparativism’, 667-673.
100 George RP, ‘Natural law, the constitution, and the theory and practice of  judicial review’ 69 Fordham 
Law Review (2001) 2269, 2274-2275.
101 Alford RP, ‘Roper v Simmons and our constitution in international equipoise’ 53 University of  California, 
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natural law jurisprudence. Not only does my classical conception of  natural law 
commit to moral cognitivism but also it is compatible with (and indeed requires) 
the respect of  the positivity of  man-made, written laws.102 Furthermore, most 
times fundamental (natural) rights are incorporated into positive (most times 
international) law. But though these human rights laws and treaties are as a mat-
ter of  fact human enactments their content remains “natural”, i.e. moral, and 
therefore the question of  the presence of  natural moral law in comparative con-
stitutionalism remains the same: one cannot do without it by means of  merely 
arguing: “Ah, but these are positive laws!”. So while it is true that big tranches of  
internationally protect ed human rights are apparently rooted in positive interna-
tional law and do not rely on natural law – and therefore that judges rightly insist 
“on the constructed and (to some extent) contingent nature of  decision-making 
on issues of  contemporary human rights”103– this is all quite irrelevant to my 
argument here given that what matters really for our purposes is where those 
rights are ultimately rooted.
If  one accepts that our common humanity underpins and makes sense of  
all that legal systems seek to achieve104 it is easy to see where the foundation of  
comparative constitutional law lies. As Carozza observes of  the Supreme Court 
decisions on the topic “the normative force of  the transnational jurisprudence 
we have examined is premised upon the recognition of  the common human-
ity of  all persons”.105 This universality “consistently provides a justification for 
courts to take foreign sources into account […]”.106 When human needs and 
problems are similar, therefore, it seems reasonable to search for inspiration in 
the answers afforded by other human beings to those needs and problems.
Legal rules and institutions are not the mere expression of  whim.107 Of  
course those who hold the contrary should not see any point in comparative 
constitutionalism, even if  they sometimes indulge in it given that the compara-
tive constitutionalist does not always need a full grounding in objective critical 
morality: for some comparative purposes more minimal, if  no less robust, prop-
Los Angeles Law Review (2005) 1, 19.
102 See generally Legarre S, ‘Derivation of  positive from natural law revisited’ 57 American Journal of  
Jurisprudence (2012 103-110 (discussing the different connections between natural and positive law).
103 McCrudden, ‘A common law of  human rights’, 528 (2000). See infra n 108.
104 Finnis J, ‘The priority of  persons’ in Oxford essays in jurisprudence: Fourth series 1-5, (2000), arguing that 
law is for the sake of  persons, with citation of  the Roman jurists.
105 Carozza, ‘My friend is a stranger’, 1080.
106 Id.
107 Waldron, ‘Foreign law and the modern ius gentium’, 145-146: “for those who see law as a matter of  
will, this sort of  theory is at best just an opportunity for haphazard legitimation.”
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ositions will do the job. Furthermore one can actually be grounded in the full set 
of  natural law theory without knowing it!108 The distinction is analogous to the one 
between doing something well and doing something well with the knowledge 
that one is doing something well. Similarly, a person – a scholar, a judge – can be 
on the right track regarding the foundations of  what he or she is doing – com-
parative constitutional law – with or without knowing that they are on the right 
track. Or: they can sometimes ignore or even deny natural law and, nevertheless, 
adhere to it unwittingly. What matters is not so much what they think or say they 
do but what they actually do: terms are less important than concepts and realities. 
So they can, perhaps, reject “natural law” doctrine, for whatever (good or bad) 
reason and, simultaneously commit to its import and premises.109
On the other hand, those who deny the reality of  natural law (with or without 
denying the name; or even using it!) and hold to moral relativism should also feel 
no attraction to the comparative constitutional enterprise.110 For this enterprise 
presupposes that there is something good we all have in common: ultimately 
our humanity and its basic needs, that can be articulated in terms of  rights (and 
political structures); it also presupposes that persons normally have the ability to 
know what that good is. In other words, the comparative enterprise presupposes 
some shared truth, accessible to human understanding, about what is at stake in 
constitutional governance. If  one declares oneself, as the moral relativist does, 
an agnostic about such truth – about what is good, what is bad, what is better 
and what is worse – why bother to search for information about our neighbour’s 
laws…?111 In short, if  relativism must rule (and rule it often does) then com-
parative constitutional law is (or should be) superfluous and unintelligible. But 
if  natural law (under any name or none) is accepted112 then the same enterprise 
108 Compare McCrudden: “Another possible explanation is that judges consider […] that human rights 
is some form of  new natural law. This does not strike me as persuasive; certainly judges do not say 
that is what they are doing.” McCrudden, ‘A common law of  human rights’, 528, emphasis in the 
original (2000). It may be true that judges do not say they are accepting natural law as the foundation 
of  comparative constitutional law; but that is not what really matters, as I argue in the text.
109 See text to note 95 infra.
110 As McCrudden puts it, “[f]or those who support cultural relativism, use of  comparisons is pointless 
[…]”.McCrudden C, ‘Judicial comparativism and human rights’ in Örücü E and Nelken D (eds), 
Comparative law: A handbook, Hart Publishing (2007) 373.
111 When the declaration of  agnosticism entails intellectual corruption and blindness to reality, it is aptly 
captured by George Orwell’s word “doublethink”, as Finnis has reminded us in his recent writing. 
Finnis J, ‘The priority of  persons revisited’ 58 American Journal on Jurisprudence 1 (2011) 45, 51.
112 It is worth noting that paramount critics of  natural law such as HLA Hart and Joseph Raz have held 
the remarkable position that judges must adjudicate following at the same time the norms of  the law 
and the norms of  morality, and that both types of  norms are to be coordinated in such a way that 
moral norms – in particular those that forbid the most serious injustices– must prevail over merely 
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is reasonable and promising, provided one keeps in mind its limited role, as dis-
cussed in the previous section of  this article. In the next section I will offer an 
example of  what happens when the promise goes wrong in adjudication.
The Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law: An Example
This section will attempt to show that, however promising, the comparative 
constitutional venture is not without risks. I shall do so by way of  an example 
involving my own country, a case in which the US constitutional law on the “Es-
tablishment Clause” of  the First Amendment113 has been improperly influencing 
the religious culture and practices of  Argentina. The illustration shows an in-
stance of  a certain judicial use of  foreign constitutional law that lies outside the 
boundaries described in this article.
Late in 2001, Argentina was undergoing a tremendous economic crisis.114 
In order to cope with it the government froze most bank accounts. People went 
mad: some went wild while others were simply depressed. Some sued the banks 
and the government. They were sometimes sent by their lawyers to lobby judges 
by means of  threatening that they would commit suicide if  they did not get their 
money back instantly; others threatened the lives of  the very judges who had to 
decide the cases; people from all walks gathered in the main hall of  the so-called 
“Palace of  Justice”, home to the Supreme Court and to the most important fed-
eral courts: the crippled, the elderly, mothers with babies, persons who had not 
slept a wink for days, people under heavy medication.115 They all gathered in a 
form of  protest. Of  course, all this was immediately catalysed by the multiplying 
effect of  television and the internet.
legal norms. See generally Orrego C, “Natural law under other names: ‘De nominibus non est disputan-
dum’” 52 American Journal on Jurisprudence (2007) 77-92.
113 US Constitution amend. I: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of  religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof  […]”.
114 See Spector H, ‘Don’t cry for me Argentina: Economic crises and the restructuring of  financial 
property’ XIV Fordham Journal of  Corporate and Financial Law (2009) 771, 777-779. A similar crisis 
had already taken place in 1989. See Garcia-Mansilla MJ, ‘Separation of  powers crisis: The case 
of  Argentina’ 32 Georgia Journal of  International and Comparative Law (2004) 307, 353-357. Indeed, 
García-Mansilla is right: “Economic emergencies are familiar in Argentina, as are restrictions on the 
economic rights of  citizens during crisis.” Id. at 354.
115 This context was accurately described to me ten years after the events took place by one of  the law 
clerks for the Federal Court of  Appeals that in the end solved the case of  the image of  the Virgin 
Mary. Email of  Juan José Galeano, 28 December 2011, on file with the author.
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A group of  protesters decided to place an image of  the Virgin Mary in the 
main hall of  the “Palace of  Justice”. The Supreme Court itself  acquiesced to the 
placement of  the image, though it is not clear from the record how the authorisa-
tion effectively materialised.116
Hundreds assembled there every single day to pray that their deposits would 
be released. This offered some relief  to many.
The Palace of  Justice had become, too, a Temple of  Justice. But some did 
not like this. They felt that their own constitutional rights were being affected 
by this transformation of  the building. “Asociación por los Derechos Civiles” 
(“ADC”), a human rights NGO significantly funded by Ford Foundation,117 filed 
suit against the Supreme Court requesting the removal of  the image of  the Vir-
gin Mary from the Palace of  Justice.118 The ADC claim was premised in part on 
a purported analogy between the Constitution of  Argentina and the Establish-
ment Clause of  the First Amendment to the US Constitution; and on American 
constitutional case law on religious freedom.119
ADC did not object to the constitutional right to religious freedom of  the 
praying petitioners but contended that it was limited by the rights of  others. Ac-
cording to ADC, the Supreme Court’s authorisation of  the presence of  the im-
age of  the Virgin Mary and of  collective recitation of  prayers within the Palace 
of  Justice jeopardised the right of  everyone to be treated equally under the law. 
Non-religious people could reasonably get the impression that Catholics might 
be favoured by the courts.120 ADC distinguished the situation of  the image of  
the Virgin Mary from the one in the American case Lynch v. Donnelly,121 where 
the US Supreme Court held that the public exhibition of  a Christmas crèche by 
a municipality did not violate the First Amendment, given that it had a “secu-
116 According to Roberto Saba, then executive director of  ADC – the claimant in the suit I am about 
to comment on – , the image of  the Virgin Mary was placed, with the acquiescence of  the Supreme 
Court, on 28 February 2002. Saba R, Laicidad y símbolos Religiosos 2 (2013).
117 See Asociación por los Derechos Civiles, La corte y los derechos 2005/2007 24 (2008) (statement by 
Roberto Saba and Álvaro Herrero in the “Foreword” to this official publication, acknowledging 
sustained contribution of  the Ford Foundation). More information about ADC at http://www.adc.
org.ar/sw_contenido.php?id=383, on 5 January 2012.
118 The suit was joined by two lawyers, Natalia Monti and Sebastián Schvartzman, invoking their own in-
dividual rights. Monti and Schvartzman were simultaneously on the legal staff  of  ADC. See http://
www.adc.org.ar/sw_contenido.php?id=383, on 5 January 2012.
119 Hernán Gullco, main counsel of  ADC (and the attorney in charge of  the law suit), kindly provided 
me with a copy of  the claim. Email of  Hernán Gullco, 27 December 2011, on file with the author. 
In Argentina there is a limited public access to legal documents produced by the parties.
120 Law suit, at section 3.1, on file with the author.
121 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984).
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lar purpose”122 independent of  its religious origin.123 This kind of  purpose was 
clearly absent, according to ADC, in the placement of  the image in the Palace 
of  Justice.
The district court agreed with ADC, relying in effect on the US case law, and 
treating it authoritatively as if  it were a US district court. The Court consequently 
ordered the removal of  the image. Several persons (invoking their affiliation to 
the Catholic religion) and “Corporación de Abogados Católicos” (an NGO that 
promotes Catholic values in the legal profession) appealed. When the Court of  
Appeals was considering the case, the image was removed as a consequence of  
an executive order of  the Supreme Court intending to comply with the district 
court’s judgment. Nevertheless, the Court of  Appeals determined the case had 
not become moot and rendered a decision on the merits.124 One judge dissented, 
determining that the Supreme Court’s acquiescence of  the district court’s ruling 
rendered unnecessary a judgment on the merits.125
The Court of  Appeals disagreed with ADC’s reasoning, which had been 
endorsed by the district court. A key tenet of  the higher court’s holding was that 
the Argentine system of  religious freedom is different from “other systems such 
as, for example, that of  the US”.126
Therefore, the Court of  Appeals held mistaken “the plaintiffs’ invocation 
of  foreign case law, rendered in the context of  legal systems different from ours 
and hence inapplicable to this claim”.127 The Court proceeded to explain what 
I have termed “the Argentine system of  religious freedom” and argued that it 
is distinct or even unique. It awarded special relevance to Article 2 of  the Con-
stitution stating that “[t]he Federal Government supports the Roman Catholic 
Apostolic Faith.”128
122 Id. at 679-680.
123 In section 3.2, the claim invokes another US Supreme Court decision, affording it apparent prec-
edential value: West Virginia State Board of  Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 638 (1943). This is a seri-
ous mistake, as we shall see.
124 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal, Sala IV [Cámara] [Fed-
eral Court of  Appeals], 04/20/2004, “Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) y otros c/ EN 
(PJN)”, Fallos de la Cámara [Fallos] (2004) (Arg.), at section 6.2 (available at http://www.pjn.gov.ar/
Publicaciones/00001/00015218.Pdf, on 11 January 2012).
125 Id., dissent of  Judge Uslenghi, at section 5.
126 Id., vote of  Judge Jeanneret de Pérez Cortés, who was joined by Judge Galli, at section 8.2.
127 Id., vote of  Judge Jeanneret de Pérez Cortés, who was joined by Judge Galli, at section 9.1.
128 Argentine Constitution art. 2.
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Even though the Court of  Appeals consequently overruled the district 
court’s decision, the image of  the Virgin Mary did not return to the Palace of  
Justice. ADC’s claim and reasoning had been rejected but the Supreme Court did 
not issue a new authorisation for the placement of  the image. Nevertheless, and 
given the rejection of  its claim, ADC appealed. The Supreme Court reversed 
the Court of  Appeals’ decision in a 5-4 judgment without giving an opinion on 
the merits. Rather, in vacating the Court of  Appeals’ decision the majority of  
the Supreme Court held that a decision on the merits was unnecessary given 
that the image of  the Virgin Mary was no longer in place at the time the Court 
of  Appeals had decided the case. Four Justices dissented, reasoning that while a 
Supreme Court’s decision on the merits had become unnecessary there was no 
need to overrule the Court of  Appeals. Both the majority and the dissent agreed 
in that they would not pronounce a view of  their own about the Court of  Ap-
peals reasoning, which remained uncontradicted.
After these summary remarks some observations are in order. While there 
is – as I have attempted to show above – value in a comparative approach to legal 
matters, not least in the area of  constitutional law, it is one thing to recur to for-
eign materials as sources of  illumination when interpreting one’s own law but it 
is a different thing – as I have also anticipated – to substitute one’s law for some-
one else’s law affording the latter an authority it does not have in one’s own legal 
system. This is what ADC would have had the Argentine judiciary do in the case 
of  the image of  the Virgin Mary – an instance of  substitution under the guise 
of  borrowing: substitution of  what one does not like of  a given legal system for 
what one prefers of  another one; precisely what Justice Scalia has criticised in his 
denunciation of  judicial comparative constitutional law.129
The case of  the Virgin Mary is particularly enlightening. The kind of  rea-
soning offered by ADC illustrates a mistake that ought to be avoided – a mis-
take swallowed by the district court but well-spotted by the Court of  Appeals. 
Over-simple as it may seem, ADC’s reasoning has the following steps: i) The 
US Supreme Court decided in Lynch v. Donnelly130 that the public exhibition of  
a Christmas crèche by a municipality did not violate the Establishment Clause 
of  the First Amendment, given that it had a “secular purpose” independent of  
129 According to Justice Scalia this selective use of  foreign constitutional law is what happened (inter 
alia) in the Roper case. Roper, 543 US, 625 (Scalia, J dissenting). Paraphrasing Justice O’Connor, also in 
Roper, what the Court did in the Argentine case of  the Virgin Mary was to assign US law a confirma-
tory role of  an Argentine constitutional law that indeed does not exist. See Roper, 543 US O’Connor 
J dissenting, 604 and text to footnote 76 above.
130 465 US 668 (1984).
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its religious origin; ii) The image of  the Virgin Mary in the Argentine Palace of  
Justice does not have such secular purpose; iii) The exhibition of  the latter image 
is in violation not only of  the First Amendment of  the US Constitution but also 
of  article 2 of  the Argentine Constitution.
Step (iii) of  the above reasoning clearly is a non-sequitur. From the premise 
that the exhibition of  the image of  the Virgin Mary would be in violation of  the 
First Amendment it does not follow that the display of  the image would also 
be in violation of  the Argentine Constitution. This should be quite obvious. 
US case law is not the law of  the land in Argentina even when the Argentine 
Supreme Court often invokes decisions of  its US counterpart.131 A precedent of  
the US Supreme Court, such as Lynch, ought not to be treated as in need of  being 
distinguished as if  it were otherwise binding for the Argentine Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the invocation of  US precedents by the Argentine Supreme 
Court is normally circumscribed to areas of  the law where the text and the his-
tory of  the Constitution permit it.132
This is not the case with the area of  religious freedom. Although the 
Argentine Constitution recognises a right to freedom of  religion,133 a unique 
provision in Article 2 of  the Constitution states that “[t]he Federal Government 
supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith.” This is in stark contrast with the 
Establishment Clause of  the First Amendment to the US Constitution declaring 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of  religion.” The 
difference is so evident that no more need be said on this score.
Conclusion
I have attempted to clarify the meanings and the boundaries of  compara-
tive constitutional law, having identified several realms where it is relevant. I have 
recognised separately what I termed academic and judicial comparative constitu-
tional law, while acknowledging too the existence of  legislative comparative con-
131 See Miller JM, ‘The authority of  a foreign talisman: a study of  us constitutional practice as authority 
in nineteenth century Argentina and the Argentine elite’s leap of  faith’ 46 American University Law 
Review. (2005) 1483, 1544–1553 (providing examples of  the Argentine Supreme Court’s borrowing 
of  US precedents).
132 Julio C Rivera Jr., El uso del derecho comparado por parte de la Corte Suprema y la importación de la doctrina de 
la real malicia, 2011-IV J.A. 3, 8 (2011) (Arg.).
133 Article 14 Constitution of  Argentina - “All inhabitants of  the Nation enjoy the following rights, in ac-
cordance with the laws that regulate their exercise, namely: […] of  freely practising their religion.”
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stitutional law. These have different meanings and different boundaries. Judicial 
comparative constitutional law – the hardest case – is only justified if  it remains 
within certain limits: for it to be a valid enterprise it ought to have a (merely) 
confirmative role; a pedagogic function; and an obiter dictum use.
Moreover, comparative constitutionalism (be it judicial, academic, or legis-
lative), particularly (though not only) in the area of  fundamental human rights, 
makes best intelligible sense if  understood in the light of  the classical notion of  
natural law (under whatever name) briefly discussed in this paper. The work of  
the legal philosopher comes here in the aid of  the comparative constitutional 
scholar; and recent contributions have indeed been made to the discussion tack-
led in this article from the philosophical perspective of  a revamped natural law 
theory. With solid foundations the comparative constitutional venture will more 
likely keep clear of  defective uses and misapplications.
